Why New Bloodshed in Syria was likely in 2025

And what research can teach us about its future

Background

Syria has suffered one of the longest (2011-2024) and most brutal civil wars in recent memory. However, the Western world gradually lost interest in the country when it became apparent that the United States would not deploy troops there, and that the murderous al-Assad family, backed by their allies, Russia and Iran, would stop at nothing in order to stay in power.

Then, in December 2024, the Levantine country swiftly recaptured Western imagination. The brutal dictator, Bashar al-Assad, was toppled in a lightning offensive by a coalition led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Sunni militant group that originated as al-Qaeda in the region before formally distancing itself in 2017.

The capture of Damascus marked the end of the al-Assad dynasty, but the violence that plagued the country continues. While the interim President, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is certainly a remarkable figure, he has inherited a nation built on Assadist sectarian patronage. In this context, any action by the new president may be perceived as threats by entrenched Assadist elites, leading to a classic example of a security dilemma (Barry Posen, 1993)

The Axioms of the Security Dilemma

1. When groups fear each other and the state can’t guarantee security, they preemptively strike to avoid being wiped out.
2. Even defensive moves look aggressive → spiral of violence.

Before examining Posen’s work and what it can reveal about Syria’s predicament, it may be helpful to quickly revisit some general facts about Syria.

What Groups Live in Syria?

And why don’t they trust each other?

Syria is part of the Bilad al-Sham (Land of the Levant), a historic region in the Middle East. In the Bilad al-Sham, Sunni Arabs were and are the majority of the population, living alongside ethnic and religious minorities such as the Alawite Arabs and the Sunni Kurds.

Sunni Arabs

Syria’s Sunni Arabs follow the Sunni interpretation of Islam, professed by a majority of Muslims wordlwide, including Saudi Arabia and the wealthy monarchies of the Persian Gulf. Despite their deep transnational ties and their majority status in Syria, Sunni Arabs have been prevented from ruling their country during virtually all of modern history: first as subjects of the Turkish-based Ottoman Empire (1517 – 1916); then as subjects of the French Mandate (1920 – 1944); and finally, during the ascendancy of the Alawite al-Assad dynasty (1971-2024). Ahmed al-Sharaa is a Sunni and captured Damascus as the head of a Sunni militant organisation.

Alawites

Syria’s Alawites, like most Syrians, are ethnic Arabs, and are the targets of the recent ethnic and sectarian violence. Alawites profess an interpretation of Islam (Alawi) that is different from that of most Syrian muslims (Sunni) and hail almost exclusively from the strategic Latakia and Tartous governorates.

Much of the bad blood between Sunnis and Alawites has its roots in the French Mandate period. Pursuing an aggressive “divide-and-rule” strategy, the French divided the region along ethnic and religious lines, pitting the Latakia and Tartous-based Alawites against the Sunni majority in a competition for resources from the French administration.

Most grievously, France specifically targeted young men from Syria’s minorities for recruitment into their colonial troops, the Troupes Spéciales du Levant. This ensured that, whenever uprisings – more often than not, led by Sunni Arabs – were crushed, the colonial boot was worn by an Alawite officer, reinforcing the separation between Alawites and Sunnis.

The Legacy of the al-Assad Dynasty

Barry Posen and the Security Dilemma in Syria

Barry Posen is a prominent political scientist known for applying international relations theory to issues of ethnic conflict and security. His influential 1993 article, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” explains how groups caught in cycles of mistrust may resort to preemptive violence, a concept that helps illuminate why conflicts like Syria’s can spiral out of control.

The Four Stages of the Security Dilemma

In his 1993 article, Posen proposes four possible stages of a security dilemma:

Stage 1: Erosion of Trust

In contexts where state institutions are weak or biased, ethnic/sectarian groups become insecure and distrustful of one another.

Stage 2: Defensive Mobilization

Groups take defensive measures (e.g., arming themselves) to protect their interests, even if these actions are intended solely for self-preservation.

Stage 3: Perceived Threat and Escalation

Because of deep-rooted mistrust, even defensive actions are perceived as offensive by others, prompting reciprocal measures.

Stage 4: Spiraling Conflict

This mutual misinterpretation creates a security dilemma, where each group’s defensive moves escalate tensions, often leading to a self-perpetuating cycle of violence.

The Recent Violence in Syria

On March 6, loyalists to Syria’s former President Bashar al-Assad attacked a garrison housing the new government’s troops in the coastal areas of Syria where the Alawite sect is concentrated, killing 16 security and Ministry of Defense personnel. Below is a brief summary of the events taken from The Arab Center in Washington D.C. (non-profit):

March 6, 2025:

• Clashes erupt in Latakia between new security forces and ex-Assad regime remnants.
• Remnants, led by Assadist warlord Ghayth Dallah, form a new military council and launch coordinated attacks.
• 16 security and Ministry of Defense personnel killed; administration buildings in Latakia and Jableh temporarily seized.
• Government calls for military reinforcements and support; widespread demonstrations occur in major cities.

March 7, 2025:

• Government forces retake key sites, including the Naval Academy in Jableh.
• The new military council expands attacks into the Alawite Mountains and other regions.
• Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa appeals for the mutineers’ surrender and vows accountability.

March 9, 2025:

• The Ministry of Defense initiates a second phase of counter-attacks, targeting mountain villages.
• Order is mostly restored in main cities; remaining clashes confined to rural areas.
• An independent national committee is formed to investigate the violent events.

March 10, 2025:

• Israeli Foreign Minister warns of escalating violence, accusing Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham of massacres.
• Russia and the United States call for a closed UN Security Council session on Syria.

March 14, 2025:

• The UN Security Council issues a unanimous statement, marking international consensus on the crisis despite geopolitical divides.

Conclusion

Drawing on Barry Posen’s analysis, breaking Syria’s cycle of sectarian violence hinges on addressing the underlying security dilemma. In a society scarred by decades of Assadist patronage, rebuilding trust must be the cornerstone of any reform. Policymakers should prioritize impartial security reforms, inclusive governance, and confidence-building measures that transform defensive posturing into constructive dialogue. While these steps may not immediately erase the deep-seated mistrust among communities, they represent a crucial pathway toward reducing preemptive escalations and ultimately steering Syria toward a more stable and peaceful future.

References

• Posen, B. (1993). “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict.” Survival, 35(1), 27–47.

• The Arab Center, Washington D.C. (2025). Timeline of the Recent Sectarian Strife on Syria’s Coast.

• Wikimedia Commons. (n.d.). Map of ethnic groups in Syria.